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THE NEW UNIONISM 
A Roundtable 
Unions have taken on a more interventionist role 
in recent years. Australia Reconstructed seems 
to have taken that process a step further. But 
this more ·strategic' approach has 
problems and pitfalls of Its own ... 
Bob Jessop teaches in Politics at the 
University of Essex in England. 
Gill Palmer teaches in Industrial 
Relations at QIT. 
Geoff Dow teaches in Humanities at 
Griffith University. 
Jason Reynolds is an economist on 
Bill Hayden's staff. 
The discussion was chaired by Colin 
Mercer and Michael Dutton. 
Colin: In tbe ll1bt of tbe Accord and, 
more recently, tbe ACTU's report 
Austrtllitl Ruonstructed, there's 
been a lot of talk about new forms 
and new styles of unionism. One 
point of particular contention on the 
left bas been tbe Involvement of the 
unJon movement in political and 
economic processes Involving the 
state and, often, tbe employer groups 
also. Geoff, you're somethin1 of a 
militant for tbls new unionism. How 
do you respond to some of the 
sceptidsm on the left and elsewhere 
to tbese trends? And what do you 
mean by 'corporatism' In tbJs 
context? 
Geoff: Well, the critics of these 
trends, 1 think, tend to argue that 
tripartite arrangements of 
government, unions and business, if 
they become institutions, are 
essentially undemocratic. They 
bypass parliamentary processes, they 
bypass whole Jots of pluralist 
prerogatives. The members of these 
groups are often self-selected. often 
they're not there so much to 
represent their constituents as to 
impose order upon their 
constituents. The critics of 
corporatism tend to see it also as a 
form of crisis management, a fairly 
arbitrary or overtly undemocratic 
way of solving particular political 
and economic problems. 
The advocates of corporatism. 
on the other hand, see it as part of a 
long-term transition from the 
reliance on market mechanisms to 
a reliance on more administered, or 
political or institutional, 
mechanisms for solving economic 
problems. And they also tend to see it 
as part of a process of the expansion 
of democracy beyond the confines of 
liberal democracy (which demarcate 
fairly strongly the realm of 
parliamentary politics and exclude 
all economic decision making from 
the public arena) - and that's a 
critique of political democracy or 
liberal democracy that's been around 
for a couple of centuries now. 
So advocates of a social 
democracy of this kind would argue 
that there is a public entitlement 
for people to have a say in what their 
health standards, or education 
standards, or income standards, or 
transport standards. or housing 
standards are. It takes a certain range 
of aspects of living standards out of 
the market area. 
The third stage of democracy. 
the corporatists would argue, is 
implied by the term "industrial 
democracy" which is to say that 
people have the right not only to 
choose governments, not only to 
decide publicly or politically a 
certain range of living standards, but 
also to decide the conditions under 
which they work, the conditions 
under which Ia bour and capital come 
together in particular enterprises in 
the production process and, 
ultimately, to decide the whole 
projectory of the economy - to 
control macro-economic decisions in 
a public or political realm rather than 
rely simply on market mechanisms. 
And, of course, if that was 
successful it would be very doubtful 
whether or not it would still be a 
capitalist economy. Whether 
corporatism is the best word to 
describe this process is another 
matter, but certainly it's an assertion 
that private capitalists or 
corporations simply do not have the 
right to determine the full range of 
economic decisions and range 
of products that are produced, living 
standards and income distribution. 
Colin: Bob, how does that 
characterisation fit your experience 
of other national corporatist models? 
Bob: Well, Geoff has not really 
described a particular national 
example but has made a general case 
for corporatism as a means of 
extending democracy from the 
parliamentary sphere into other 
spheres. This involves changing and 
broadening the meaning of "people" 
as the locus of sovereignty. In 
parliamentary democracy, the 
"people" are the individual citizens; 
and, in a social democracy, they 
would comprise households and the 
organisations of civil society. 
But economic democracy is 
ambiguous: the people could refer to 
a broad national-popular control 
over the economy or to workers' and 
managers' control over specific firms 
or sectors. In the latter case there is a 
danger that corporatism could lead 
to narrow productivist cartels which 
oJ)erate at the expense of consumers, 
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other economic interests, or a 
democratically accountable state. 
This is where national experience 
could be useful: if we're to think of 
corporatism as a potential form of 
economic democracy. then we have 
to look at how broadly the "people" 
should be understood in relation to 
economic democracy. 1 think that 
judgments about whether 
corporatism is a good or bad thing 
will depend very much on the 
particular forms assumed by this 
extension of democracy into the 
Gill: In Britain, I've seen 
Accord-style policies repeat-
edly become discredited and 
fail to gain popular support 
e 
economic field . 
Here, a lot will depend on the 
levels at which corporatism operates. 
It could be micro-corporatism at the 
level of the firm: Japanese style 
corporatism is relevant here - a 
corporatism without direct 
involvement of the state or the labour 
movement. But it could also be at the 
industrial or the regional level. An 
instance here would be corporatism 
as a means of restructuring the steel 
or coal industries in certain regions 
of West Germany: this involved all 
the local firms in an industry, the 
relevant trade union, and the local 
state. 
Finally, we could have macro-
corporatism at national level: this 
would go beyond the involvement of 
management and workers acting in 
their immediate "economic-
corporate" interests to include other 
forms of popular involvement 
through political parties, unions, 
consumer bodies, interest groups and 
so forth. If we accept Geoffs 
argument that corporatism is one 
way to extend economic democracy, 
then the interesting question is when 
does economic democracy come into 
conflict with the political and social 
sides of democratic involvement. 
This would have to be studied from 
country to country and period to 
period. 
Geoff: Are you saying that in 
particular national contexts, that the 
micro level corporatism can simply 
be a reactionary and undemocratic 
way of securing solutions to other 
problems? 
Bob: Depending on how trade 
unions are organised, micro-level 
corporatism could become selective. 
The restructuring of steel in West 
Germany involved mainly a skilled, 
male, German core of workers co-
operating with employers to 
reorganise the industry, and 
unskilled workers, women workers, 
and immigrant workers suffered. 
You have to consider who's being 
represented by the unions: if it's only 
part of the workforce, then, whether 
"reactionary" is an appropriate 
term or not, significant groups will be 
ignored . 
Colin: One of the accusations that 
was levelled against the Accord was 
that, for all its virtues, it never 
managed effectively to sell itself to 
the majority of the population. It 
sold itself within, as it were, the 
corporatist structures, within the 
various representative bodies, 
but never effectively became a 
popular Accord with the majority of 
the Australian population. Is that a 
fair characterisation, Jason? 
Jason: Even up until the last federal 
election, I'm pretty sure that the 
majority of Australian people would 
not have had a clear idea of what the 
implications of the Accord were in 
total. The government has still 
attempted to explain to people 
exactly what the benefits of the 
Accord have been, usually it has 
talked in terms of how many jobs 
have been created, what's the 
situation with the growth •n 
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Australia, inflation and that sort of 
thing. But since the industry policy 
obviously only affects certain groups 
(there's something like eleven 
industry councils), you can't get that 
concept across to all the Australian 
people because it just doesn't affect 
them. So there's a whole range of 
issues on which the general public 
does not understand the overall 
implications of what's been going on. 
Gill: I've been amazed at the survival 
of the Accord. Coming from Britain, 
I've seen Accord-type policies 
repeatedly become discredited and 
fail to gain popular support. There 
it's been the anti-corporatist appeals 
to market flexibility that have won 
elections. In Australia, the Accord 
was apparently not an electoral 
liability in the 1987 elections. No 
doubt the Joh factor ~ dividing the 
opposition - partly explained 
Hawke's victory, but it does seem 
there was some basis of support for 
Accord-type policies. I would argue 
that this could be because Australia 
has a long tradition of a form of 
corporatism in the Conciliation and 
Arbitration system. 
Colin: You're arguing that the 
industrial tribunals are a form of 
corporatism and that therefore 
corporatist structures are not new to 
Australia? 
Gill: Yes, most discussion of 
Australian corporatism has been 
associated with the Hawke 
government. Hut tt seems to me that 
in the Conciliation and Arbitration 
system. Australia has over 80 years of 
experience of a form of corporatism. 
Picking up Bob's point about 
different types and levels of 
corporatism, the tribunals have 
provided a form of tripartite 
administration over pay and hours of 
work that is far more corporatist 
than any collective bargaining 
system of industrial relations. 
In the early stages, the 
Conciliation and Arbitration system 
was also associated with tariff 
policies to provide the administered 
regulation of product markets. The 
degree of centralisation of the 
decision making has varied, but the 
system has given Australia a 
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uniquely long tradition of using 
notions of the "public interest" in the 
administration of economic issues. 
Also, the social networks of the 
"Industrial Relations Club" have 
provided unions' and employers' 
representatives with experience of 
operating this type of system. 
Hawke's policies are not such a 
radical break with the past as similar 
policies were in the UK. The 
tribunals have provided a form of 
tripartite or pressure group 
administration, even if only over a 
limited range of economic issues. 
Geoff: 1 must say that I'm reasonably 
unimpressed by the argument that 
says the Accord wasn't sold and 
wasn't a popular document. Because 
following the demise of the Whittam 
government, the Metal Workers and 
a few other unions took on the most 
expansive campaign of public 
involvement in economic policy seen 
~ince the 1940s in Australia and they 
produced document after document, 
asserting the right of the trade unions 
to have some say in macro economic 
policy. The Accord was the product 
of seven or eight years of fairly 
democratic and widespread and 
sustained involvement by a whole lot 
of groups, especially trade unions, 
but not only them. So that when the 
Accord document was finally put 
together by 1983, the right ofunions 
to be involved in these things had 
been asserted for quite a few years. 
With respect to exactly how it is 
operated. one must say that it has 
meant different things for different 
peoole. And that's imoortant. for ~o 
many people m the government it 
was always primarily an incomes 
policy, and Keating still refers to the 
term Prices and Incomes Accord. Yet 
the document is actually called "An 
Accord between the ACTU and the 
ALP concerning Economic Policy" 
- and when you look through it it 
doesn't refer only to the demand for 
indexation, it refers to industry 
policy and a full range of supporting 
policies; and in fact, the reason why 
the unions were so happy with it is 
that, precisely, it did depart quite 
dramatically from the British 
experience of incomes policies 
during the Wilst>n and Callaghan 
eras. Incomes policies had been 
consistently foisted upon unions and 
then reneged upon by the 
government so that real wages had 
dropped. 
But with indexation in Australia, 
real incomes actually dropped less 
than in almost every other OECD 
country, and the unions, quite 
rightly, it seems to me, saw the value 
of baving that sort of protection to 
wages, to enable them to divert their 
energies to other strategies - for 
example, the industry policy issues, 
taxation reform, budgetary reform 
Now, the fact that all those things 
have been Jess than brilliantly 
successful isn't the point: the point is 
that the persistence of indexation 
during the Fraser and the first stages 
of the Hawke government gave the 
unions a quite valuable breathing 
space, and sthey've certainly asserted 
their right to be involved in macro-
policy and especially in industry 
policy. 
Now, alongside the successes of 
the Accord, there is a whole list of 
downside items - the floating of the 
dollar, deregulation of the financial 
markets, the continuing deficit 
paranoia, the continuing powers of 
the Treasury, the continuing power 
of the industries annihilation 
commission, the complete failure of 
the government to take industry 
policy seriously, the commitment of 
Hawke to the trilogy, reducing the 
size of the public sector, reducing 
taxation, the privatisation 
bandwagon that's developing at the 
moment- and at some point I think 
all those things tip the balance, and 
the bottom line might well be a 
negative one. But let's remember that 
all those things are things that the 
government are doing outside the 
Accord: the Accord itself doesn't 
invite any of those things. 
Michael: Can I come in and defend 
Colin here? It seems to me that, in a 
sense, what you have said, Geoff, 
about how the Accord has been sold 
is right, but it's nevertheless been sold 
in a very particular way - and I 
think that what Colin's trying to cet 
at is the fact that the Accord has only 
been accepted in a very passive way. 
So that when employers did do that 
at the tax summit, it didn't lead to a 
mass popular backlash. And I think 
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that that was what Colin was trying 
to get at - that there wasn't popular 
mobilisation around the Accord. 
Now I think that this raises a wider 
question about the relationships 
between the Accord and popular 
movements outside the trade union 
movement. 
Colin: Perhaps I could add 
something to that. It seems to me that 
one of the major. weaknesses of 
corporate structures is their 
vulnerability to populist movements 
of the New Right. That's certainly, I 
think, the case in Britain. AU the 
major institutions of corporate 
tripartite bargaining have 
disappeared into the background. 
It's been one of the great successes of 
a form of New Right populism under 
Margaret Thatcher. And one of the 
problems that follows on from that is 
if, say, the Australian government is 
not effectively able to mobilise 
people around key issues like the 
social wage, taxation policy and so 
on, then it is leaving its flank open to 
the New Right. 
I think we saw that in the 
election campaign last year. Certain 
weaknesses were revealed in the 
corporatist structure which Job and 
the Australian Small Business 
Association and Andrew Hay's 
organisation and so on were able to 
attack, and present corporatism as 
essentially a deal between 
government and the u,nions. That, I 
think, is the most glaring weakness of 
corporatism which needs to be 
addressed. 
Bob, would you like to say 
something about Thatcherism in that 
context? 
Bob: Yes. But before talking about 
Thatcherism, we should clear up the 
meaning of "popular". There are 
three different definitions floating 
around in our discussion of the 
Accord: was it generally understood 
by the people, was it popular with 
them, and was there a popular 
mobilisation around it? I'm not an 
expert on Australia, nor the Accord 
but I'm reasonably convinced that 
the Accord's purpose was widely 
understood (at least at the general 
macro-level, even if its specific 
implications for particular industries 
might not have been). It also seems to 
have been popular for some time. But 
I don't know of any corporatist 
system anywhere which has enjoyed 
massive popular mobilisation either 
to introduce it or to defend it when 
under attack. Th1s is very relevant to 
defending corporatism when it's 
under attack from the right. 
This is where British experience 
is relevant. Corporatist experiments 
in Bntain have generally been ad hoc, 
introduced without prior 
preparation, typically for purposes 
of short-term crisis management. 
This is in clear contrast to what Jason 
and Geoff have said about the 
introduction of the Accord here in 
Australia. In Britam, corporatist 
strategies are adopted when there is a 
cns1s requiring urgent remedial 
action; they quickly become means 
of incomes restraint, mobilising 
union leaders to police their 
members' pay demands; and, 
because they are usually crisis-
measures, governments have little 
room for economic and political 
manoeuvre and find it hard to deliver 
their side of any corporatist bargain. 
In turn, this provokes rank-and-
file discontent and, where it seems 
that corporatist arrangements are 
working against the interests of 
capital. widespread agitation in the 
press as well. This reinforces the 
negative, restrictive aspects of 
corporatism and makes it vulnerable 
to charges of stat1sm, directiOmsm, 
lack of democracy, overweening 
union power, etc. That's why 
corporatism in Britain is hard to . 
defend against rightwing agitation 
and populist Thatcherist attacks. 
This can be contrasted with the 
heyday of corporatism in Britain: the 
Second World War. Corporatism 
was introduced when the labour 
movement was strong; labour, rather 
than finance, was the crucial resource 
10 short supply; there was widespread 
popular mobilisation in a "People's 
War"; and corporatist institutions 
played a key role in organising the 
war effort. In this period, 
corporatism was effect1ve and 
provided part of the background to 
the successful implementation of the 
postwar settlement. It was then 
dismantled during the boom years of 
the 'fifties and became hard to 
reinvigorate during cnses. 
But where corporatism has a 
long history, is widely supported, has 
a range of functions 1t can play, and a 
range of forces with vested interests 
in its survival, then corporatism can 
be used in crisis management with 
some effect. Even if specific forces 
fear that their interests are being 
Colin: One of the major 
weaknesses of corporatism is 
its vulnerability to populist 
movements of the right 
e 
damaged , they can hope to 
reorganise and tum corporatist 
institutions to their advantage at a 
later date. 
Geoff: I've a feeling that the popular 
and democratic elements which are 
or are not in corporatist institutions 
aren't the whole story. For example, 
take the common case - full 
employment. It seems to me that this 
benefits everyone in society, whether 
they are waged, unwaged, male or 
female, young or old, in or out of the 
workforce - full employment is a 
sign of healthy society. And full 
employment doesn't mean a whole 
lot of labour market segmentation, 
and a whole pile of really ratshit jobs. 
So, if unions can fight for full 
employment - and unions are the 
only organisations in modern 
capitalist societies that do 
consistently fight for full 
employment - then it is a leap 
forward. And the extent of its 
popular support or democratic 
sanctioning is not really the issue. 
Gill: The experience of the 
arbitration system puts a cloud on 
being too romantic about the 
potential democracy that we see 
ahead of us in the long march to 
corporatism. I mean, the 
development of these sorts of 
strategies might have a lot of 
advantages, but it isn't necessarily 
going to be the rosy populist 
democracy that I think Geoff 
painted at the start. Certain changes 
Jason: The Australian people 
won't go for the massive selling 
off of assets which have been in 
public bands for a long time 
e 
might occur, slightly different 
priorities might prefer these 
structures, but basic power 
structures in society are still 
obviously important in the allocation 
of resources. 
Colin: Wbat about the current 
strategy of the Labor government in 
relation to the tradition of 
corporatism? How do strategies like 
the deregulation of the financial 
sector and tbe possibility of 
privatisation of other major public 
utilities fit into the structure of 
corporatism in Australia? 
Geoff: If those things go ahead, then 
the whole thing would be sunk, I 
imagine. 
Colin: Is tbat your feeling Jason? 
Jason: Financial deregulation has 
already occurred in Australia, to a 
large extent, and it hasn't been sunk 
at all. Privatisation is a different issue 
altogether. My personal position is 
that, generally, the people of 
Australia won't go for the mass 
sellin~ off of assets that have been in 
public hands for a long period of 
time. There probably is some sort of 
ca~e by case approach you could 
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take there might be no real 
necessity for government to have 
control mainly because monopoly 
power may not exist in a particular 
industry any more. I think, because 
thmgs change over a long period of 
time, you can't have an absolute "no 
go" position on it, but I think in 
general there would be very little 
change at all as far as privatisation is 
concerned. 
Michael: Geoff, why do you think 
major privatisation would sink any 
corporatist strategy? 
Geoff: First of all, because 
privat"ation per se reduces the 
democratic sphere of the economy, 
however imperfect that has been, and 
increases private control of the 
economy. In that sense, it is 
undemocratic. Secondly, the 
privatisation of certain public sector 
activities - Jet's take Telecom, for 
instance simply takes away from 
the publi~ sector, or from the public 
realm, the possibility of quite fruitful 
and useful cross-subsidisation of 
other activities. 
Bob: Can 1 come back on two issues? 
Firstly, 1 doubt whether privatisation 
actually spells disaster for 
corporatism: Sweden is meant to 
have a successful corporatism, but it 
also has one of the smallest public, 
industrial sectors in Europe. It's not a 
question of private or public 
ownership but of involvement in a 
concerted economic strategy that's 
important. Secondly, it's not whether 
firms are generating enough profits 
in some areas to be able to cross-
subsidise other activities that is 
important. The crucial quesiton is 
how far activities deemed through 
democratic debate to be in the public 
intet:est can be subsidised: a 
government could give grants-in-aid 
to private firms to secure goods and 
services deemed in the public 
interest. Conversely, a state firm 
which cross-subsidised without 
public debate might not be acting in 
the public interest. 
Neither of these points means 
that I think privatisation is a good 
thing. I think it has clear dangers. 
Hut analyses of corporatism show 
that it's not the iegal ownership of 
industry which matters for successful 
t 
corporatism: Sweden has limited 
state industry, but Austria (another 
successful case) has extensive state 
ownership. 
What's important is the 
existence of a coherent industrial 
core with strong intra- and inter-
industry linkages which are seen as 
such by government, unions, and 
business and can be exploited to 
pursue a coherent national industrial 
strategy. For linkages of this kind 
reinforce interdependencies and 
make it important for different 
interests to work out a common 
strategy. In this context, private 
owners can become trustees of the 
public interest (as in the Swedish 
model); and state industry managers 
can take account of private sector 
interests (as in the Austrian model). 
It's here that I see the dangers 
from privatisation: it could 
encourage neglect of the public 
\nterest. This is more likely in today's 
context of financial deregulation and 
transnational firms - which 
reinforces the narrow, short-term 
outlook as regards financial returns 
and encourages transnational 
companies to look at international 
linkages rather than the national 
core. 
Colin: Can I bring us round then to 
tbe pursuit of tbe ACTU's report, 
Australia R~constructedt Perhaps I 
can ask for general comments on the 
report's significance and potential. 
Gill: I think, in terms of 
demonstrating the initiatives that the 
union movement is making in 
Australia, it's quite remarkable and 
very interesting. You have here an 
extraordinarily well-organised 
ACTU officialdom which is taking 
initiatives on the political and 
economtc fronts - which is very 
unusual if you think about union 
movements in many more liberal 
countries. 
Now, to the extent to which This 
can be fed through to policy 
.directions by government depends 
~ntirely upon the power structures 
iand the opposition of anti-
corporatist forces. We haven't talked 
a great deal about the anti-
corporatist forces, but I think we 
shouldn't forget the importance of 
·~.j· 
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international financial capital as a 
major anti-corporatist pressure on 
all societies, including Australia. I 
think it's evident in Australia that 
some of these attempts to widen the 
unions' influence in economic 
regulation are going to be very 
fiercely resisted - successfully too 
no doubt in many ways. 
Bob: Yes, I found the document very 
interesting - especially as such a 
document could never have been 
produced in Britain. But I think that 
we should take the chance to discuss 
its broader political significance in 
the way that Colin and Mike 
attempted earlier. Because it seems to 
me that, however you read Australia 
Reconstructed, it's primarily about 
an alternative economic strategy: it is 
less concerned with political and 
social reconstruction, political and 
social democracy. This means that it 
Bob: It's not a question of 
private or public ownership 
but of involvement in 
a concerted economic strategy 
that's important 
has neglected the role of various 
forces which might have an interest 
in democratising Australian society 
and/ or in supporting an alternative 
economic strategy (AES). The 
document focuses on strategic 
unionism as the driving force behind 
reconstruction and it addresses 
largely government, the unions, and 
the ALP. But it doesn't consider 
what other forces should be 
addressed, what forms of political 
mobilisation there should be outside 
the trade unions, how anti-
corporatist forces could be 
neutralised. The British experience is 
relevant here. For Mrs Thatcher's 
ability to roll back the gains of the 
social democratic postwar settlement 
depends crucially on the isolation of 
the trade union movement. 
Geoff: Bob, what are the forces you 
think are important, and what do 
you mean by broader support for 
these interventionist strategies? 
Bob: Well, strategic unionism 
involves tripartite restructuring of 
the Australian economy. Let's look 
at some aspects of restructuring. The 
Green movement could have a 
major interest in the forms of 
restructuring and it's worth 
addressing this interest. In West 
Germany, for instance, Green 
mobilisation has been undercut 
because some Christian Democrats 
have advocated "ecological 
modernisation" as part of German 
industrial strategy: in Australia, 
Greens could be mobilised behind 
the AES if local green concerns were 
addressed and, with a worldwide 
interest in green issues, developing 
ecologically sound products might 
even advance the international 
competitiveness of the Australian 
economy. 
Take another example: the 
peace movement. Is industrial 
restructuring to be neutral about the 
military-industrial complex or 
should it be concerned with 
promoting civilian R & D and 
civilian industries? This also has 
implications for jobs. Should one 
defend full employment by 
supporting military and / or 
ecologically unsound industries? A 
third area is feminism. Industrial 
restructuring has clear implications 
for the restructuring of the labour 
market, the welfare state, the nature 
of household work. Whether or not 
women are directly involved in the 
labour market and are or are not 
union members, it is clear that they 
have an interest in reconstruction. 
Australia Reconstructed addresses 
the tssues of education and reskilling 
the labour force but it doesn't look at 
its implications for the welfare state 
- something of special concern to 
women's movements. 
So there are three examples 
greens, nuclear and peace 
movements, and feminism - where 
considering something beyond 
strategic unionism is important. It's 
not enough to argue that 
Gill: Some of these attempts to 
widen the unions' influence in 
economic regulation are going 
to be very fiercely resisted 
corporatism will bring full 
employment: full employment in 
ecologically unsound industries, in 
the military-industrial complex, in 
low-paid, part-time, hire-and-fire 
jobs for women? Surely not. This is 
where it would pay political 
dividends to broaden the debate 
beyond strategic unionism: to 
mobilise support and to help defend 
the alternative economic strategy 
when it comes under attack - as it 
surely will. 
Geoff: I agree with you that the form 
of restructuring is absolutely 
important. But what I feel a bit 
worried about is that these are not 
new issues. A concern for particular 
types of restructunng, particular 
types of economic or industrial 
activity is a concern that has been in 
the post-Keynesian lexicon for forty 
years, from Joan Robinson onwards. 
What I'm a little bit worried 
about, as well, is the tendency to take 
on board the Greens' argument as an 
anti-growth argument. Environ-
mentalists sometimes say that 
economic growth is the problem and 
that trying to return to it is not the 
solution. And I think that is 
fundamentally misguided. Because. 
quite clearly, you can have high levels 
of economic growth and 
employment creation in areas which 
don't produce any environmental 
devastation at all (the service 
industries are good examples of 
that). Similarly, since I 974, we've 
had pretty well the demise of 
economic growth in the west, yet 
environmental devastation and 
production of harmful products goes 
on unabated. With the issue of 
feminism, and the feminist critique of 
these sorts of models. we've a slightly 
different set of questions Once 
again. full employment advocates 
would certainly only ad\'ocate high 
quality jobs. jobs with career 
Bob: What's crucial is 
changing the balance of forces 
prospects. and decent pay. without 
segmentation. without the option of 
women being brought in and out of 
the workforce, as it suits the cycles of 
the economy - no advocate of full 
cmplo:yment wants flexible workers 
in that sense. 
Once again, I resist the idea that 
discussions of the social wage and the 
welfare state arc explicitly feminist 
issues The rights of welfare clients, 
the demands for decommodified 
production, for high pensions, for 
unemployment benefits, for housing 
to be subsidised and so forth, are not 
feminist issues: they've been 
labour movement issues for a 
hundred years. All those issues, it 
seems to me, don't necessarily 
require a specific constituency to 
advocate them. You don't need 
environmentalists to say that we've 
got to be careful about what sorts of 
products we make. You don't need 
feminists to say that we've got to have 
a decent welfare state and no 
segmented labour forces · any 
sensible person would argue these 
things. 
Bob: I think this argument is terriby 
confused. It's not just a question of 
who is competent to speak on these 
topics even if any sensible person 
might arglle along these lines. It's a 
question of the balance of forces. 
And the balance of forces will be 
more sound ecologically, sounder in 
femmist terms, sounder on peace 
issues, if the AES gets support not 
only from the unions but from the 
green movement, femmists, and 
peace campaigners. If there is broad 
popular mobilisation and wide 
alliances, then the alternative 
strategy will be easier to defend. 
Not only that, the record of the 
union movement on these issues is 
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not as wonderful as Geoff has 
painted it. It may be true that some 
members of the union movement 
have spoken up -"sensibly"- on 
these issues; but the union 
movement's record is far from 
unambiguous as a whole. Mobilising 
other forces around these issues will 
help to change attitudes and policies 
within the union movement itself. It's 
not at all a question of who is 
competent to talk on such issues: I'm 
not trying to say that only women 
can talk on women's issues any more 
than Geoff is saying that only unions 
are competent to talk about 
economic issues. It's a question of 
mobilisation. The Nationals, for 
instance, probably don't care about 
what the unions say about the AES 
and its implications for women: the 
unions aren't part of their natural 
constituency. But if women start 
raising these issues within the Liberal 
and National parties, then it becomes 
relevant. What's crucial is changing 
the balance of forces. 
Gill: We're talking about who has the 
power to affect these things and 
represent certain interests. I think 
what we.'re getting to is the limits of 
trade uniohs ·as representatives ot 
class interests. I think trade unions 
are very important: they are usually 
by far the best mobilised of 
progressive movements and they can 
attack and address economic issues. 
But it's a mistake to assume that, 
without extra mobilisation and 
support, they can address issues like 
the green issues, the peace issues and 
feminist issues. Unions are 
institutions which are shaped, to 
some degree, by the economic 
structures in which they exist and 
they are formed around the 
economic interests which employers 
generate. So it is naive I think to 
assume that the unions can represent 
all social and class interests. They 
can't represent broader interests on 
questions of, for example, whether 
jobs should be saved in the 
rarnforests, when they are 
representmg forest workers. You do 
need to have these other 
mobilisations to make sure that these 
wider issues are""fed through the 
union movement can do a fair bit but 
there are limits to the extent to which 
unions, formed as they are around 
our economic structures in society, 
can represent these wider issues that 
Bob is talking about. 
Michael: I'm not sure just how far 
Geoff's history goes back when he 
says that "we've always been 
concerned with women's issues and 
the environmental issues". He seems 
to be saying that there has never been 
a problem for economism In the left 
- it just seems to me rather that 
these issues have sometimes been 
addressed, but they have been 
addressed in partial and limited 
ways. 
Colin: On that one I've got a 
comment which Ill put in - which is 
this: the question, it seems to me, is 
really to do with strategic alliances: 
that is, strategic alliances in order for 
Geoff: You don't need 
feminists to say that we've got 
to have a decent welfare state 
... any sensible person would 
argue that 
e 
corporatist structures to maintain 
themselves against a populist 
movement, such as the Job for 
Canberra push early last year. 
Geoff: I'm less convinced of the need 
to form alliances as an important 
issue - that's an electoral issue, but 
Bob Hawke can do that quite well. 
Gill: It seems to me that, on the 
contrary, the formation of alliances 
is the essence of corporatism. We're 
looking at the strategic alliances that 
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are formed within power groups 
within society- that's what it is, isn't 
it? 
Geoff: No, not at all. To me 
corporatism is nothing to do with 
building alliances between different 
groups, but expanding a range of 
issues which come up for democratic 
decision. 
Bob: Who is making these 
democratic decisions? 
Geoff: Trade unions, employers and 
governments is one way. 
Bob: So, tf I'm not mvolved in a trade 
union, I can't be represented: that 
doesn't sound very democratic. How 
can it be democratic when there are 
constituencies which don't get 
represented? Or are you arguing that, 
as long as unions are calling for "jobs 
for all", everyone is virtually 
represented because everyone has an 
interest in full employment? That 
might be an argument for changing 
the decision-makers; it doesn't lead 
to an expansion of democracy. 
Democracy operates because there 
are clear institutional channels for 
groups to feed into the decision-
making process. 
Geoff: That's not how you'd define 
economic democracy. I do think 
what you said facetiously about full 
employment is true, I do think people 
are represented and benefited 
whether they know it or not. It's not a 
matter of having every employer 
represented -JUSt as 1t 's not a matter 
of having every worker, non-worker, 
unemployed worker, spouse of a 
worker, represented - it's having a 
new basis for making the decisions 
about income distribution and 
investment that's important. 
Colin: But there is a problem there in 
recognising what used to be caUed 
the specificity of the political. In 
other words, there is at least a relative 
autonomy to the political domain 
which means that, no matter what 
economic decisions are taken, no 
matter what corporate bargaining 
structures are used, the outcome is 
not necessarily guaranteed by those 
processes of decision making alone. 
That's one of the things the New 
Right is most skilled at 
understanding, and Margaret 
Thatcher clearly recognises. 
Popular capitalism, as it's called 
in England now, is not just the 
outcome of certain economic 
changes, it's also mobilised by a 
wider political and ideological battle 
as well. An example is the recent 
campaign around selling British Gas 
shares - teD Sid you can go and buy 
shares at the local branch ofthe bank 
- went the ads, to which the reply 
was "Tell Sid he already owns it!" 
That sort of concerted, partly 
political-cultural campaign is also 
quite important and can, in turn, 
decisively affect the nature of those 
economic decisions which are taken 
in the first place. The idea that there 
are automatic poHtical outcomes in a 
representative domain, after 
corporate decisions are made, 
doesn't seem to square with the 
contemporary reconstruction of 
corporate structures in countries like 
Britain. 
BOB: How can it be 
democratic when there are 
constituencies which don't get 
represented? 
Geoff: I don't think there are 
automatic outcomes. The singular 
fact about most public policy 
disucssion these days is that no state 
controls the outcomes of its public 
policy decisions, completely. If that 
were the case, there would be no 
unemployment or inflation 
anywhere. But what I do say is that if 
you try to control a capitalist 
economy, you do it much better if 
you have it made according to these 
corporatist, administered, explicitly 
negotiated criteria, than you do if 
you have it made according to 
market criteria, criteria of 
profitability. 
Gill: But you can't be that absolute, 
can you? I mean, we have enough 
expenence of fascist regimes to 
reali se that the corporatist 
institutions or mock forms of 
corporatist institutions can be used 
for objectives which, presumably, 
you would not accept. It all depends 
on the extent to which you see the 
representative organs as being 
genuinely representative; it's a 
question of what power they mobilise 
against the countervailing power of 
capital - and that varies in each 
context. I don't think you can make 
b Ian k e t a S"s u m p t ions that 
corporatism is good or bad it 
depends really on the power forces 
that are flowing through it to affect 
the eventual decisions. 
Geoff: Yes, of course. Clearly, you 
can have fascist corporatism which is 
not at all committed. Actually, it's 
technically efficient in getting full 
employment ... but not what we 
would advocate. 
Bob: When we're discussing 
corporatism. we've got to be very 
careful that we don't just look at the 
lessons of the I 960s and 1970s. We 
have to look at how corporatism 
might function in the coming 
decades. The shift away from mass 
production to more flexible 
production also implies a shift of the 
key sites for economic decision-
making towards the enterprise level. 
This is already evident in Europe 
with the trend towards micro-
corporatism (plant level bargaining, 
works councils, etc.); the danger here 
is that, the lower the level at which 
corporatism operates, the more 
likely is it that significant interests 
are ignored. 
This is even more dangerous for 
democracy when the trend is towards 
greater segmentation in the labour 
market: a division between a skill-
flexible, well-paid core in an internal 
labour market and a periphery of 
low-paid, Jess skilled workers in an 
external labour market. Such trends 
could undermine unions'claims to be 
democratic. since the interests of the 
core are not those of the workforce as 
a whole - Jet alone the people as a 
whole. 
Thus, we run the risk of 
developing a selective corporatism 
rather than the universal, democratic 
corporatism Geoff would like to see. 
If we take this threat seriously, then 
we must look seriously at the 
question of alliances. 
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